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Introduction
In International Relations theory and research only few concepts and activities deal explicitly with the South in global governance. Most works focus on governance and policy making by and in developed countries of the North or the so-called OECD world (for a similar critique see: Thomas/Wilkin 2004; Conzelmann/Faust 2005) . Only in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on 9/11 both in real politics and in political science the situation in developing countries and their relations to global politics attracted more attention.
Besides the bias towards research on Northern topics due to the fact that most of the influential research institutes and universities are based in industrialised countries, there are at least two more reasons for the deficits in research on the role of Southern actors. First, the terms 'South', 'Third World' and 'developing countries' were put into question in the 1990s
for several good reasons. It was argued that economic, political and social processes had led to a rapidly increasing differentiation among the developing countries, so that one generalising term would be too imprecise, and that poorer countries do not build a homogenous political bloc or coalition (cf. Menzel 1992; Nohlen/Nuscheler 1992; Hein 1998; Ashcroft 1999; 6 Bartsch/Kohlmorgen: The Role of Southern Actors in Global Governance Thomas/Wilkin 2004) . Second, structural changes in international politics made it more and more inappropriate to deal only with governments, states and International Organisations as political actors and fora in the international -or better: global -realm. Non-state actors such as CSOs, transnational corporations (TNCs) and foundations as well as hybrid governance forms (e.g. public-private partnerships) played a more and more important role (cf. Rosenau 1997; Held/McGrew 2002 , Wilkinson 2005 Koenig-Archibugi/Zürn 2006) . Thus, many researchers focused more on these so-called new types of actors and organisations and less on questions how Southern actors are affected by and integrated in this new governance architecture.
In this paper 1 , we argue that it is necessary to open the governance discourse more towards the Non-OECD world and to take into account the relevance of the governance structures which influence the participation of Southern actors, the power relations which are shaping the constellation of actors, and the processes of interaction that are relevant for framing policy ideas, discourses and activities in the global realm. We agree with the argument that 'the South' is not a homogenous group of countries or even a kind of collective actor, but think it is still reasonable to use that category for sociological and political science analyses if it is based on common socio-economic characteristics and on similar experiences such as a peripheral position in the global economy, widespread poverty, human insecurity and a great vulnerability to external processes and forces (cf. Conzelmann/Faust 2005) . This socioeconomic fragile and peripheral position is intertwined with a peripheral role in global governance or 'with a lack of say in global affairs' as Thomas/Wilkin (2004: 243) 7 how they are affected by them. To analyse more systematically these interactions we introduce the concept of interfaces -socio-political spaces of recurrent interaction of actors in the handling of specific problems -and differentiate between organisational, discoursive, legal and resource-transfer interfaces in global governance. We argue that such an approach allows us to capture more in detail the various channels of influence of Southern actors in global governance than conventional approaches that largely neglect the Non-OECD world.
In this paper, we will show that despite the dominance of actors from Northern countries in particular areas of global governance basically weak actors like civil society organisations (CSOs) and governments from the South have the chance to influence strategies and policies due to the institutional setting of global governance.
We will focus our empirical analysis of the role of Southern actors in global processes of governance on the policy field of global health. This policy field seems appropriate for our analysis for several reasons: First, essential parts of global health governance -such as the In the following we will first outline our global governance approach, focussing on power relations and interfaces between different actors (section 2). Before applying this concept to the empirical study, in section 3 we will briefly sketch the institutional structure of global health governance. In section 4 we will then analyse the role of both state and non-state actors from the South in a specific area of global health: the fight against HIV/AIDS and the access to medicines. We examine Southern participation in the most relevant International Organisations in health, analyse the role of Southern actors in the discourses on patents, intellectual property rights and access to medicines, and deal with the various financing mechanisms in the field of global health. In the concluding remarks (section 5), the most important lessons for Southern participation in processes of global governance drawn from the empirical study of the global health sector will be summarized. 
Global Governance: Conceptual Considerations
Our concept of global governance is not a normative one, saying how global governance should be, but an empirical-analytical one, which tries to describe and to understand the origins, the complex characteristics and the dynamics of global politics and regulations. In our understanding, global governance comprises non-hierarchical forms of regulation and cooperation, but also power structures and hierarchical top-down processes. It is selective as far as the problems and issues dealt with are concerned, and also with respect to the inclusion and influence of weaker actors -such as many Southern governments or CSOs.
Political globalisation is not only a process leading to the development of a new spatial order which causes increasing political activities between different levels (global, regional, na- Global governance thus can be understood as a process of dealing with problems and -if possible -of problem-solving. However, the acknowledgement of problems and the willingness to tackle them are not self-evident. Problems need to be identified and put on the agenda, and the related discourses have to be framed. This agenda-setting and framing process is a result of the interactions between the different actors and is influenced by the making we can not just focus on the effectiveness of problem-solving, but have to analyse the interactions in global governance in the light of the different types of power and interests that are associated with the actors.
The normative problem-solving bias of some parts of the global governance literature often leads to the implicit assumption that most of the actors have common or similar goals and interests. In particular if we want to understand the role of Southern actors in global governance, however, it is relevant to address the differences and the conflicting characters of interests of the actors involved. Also power relations seem to be forgotten in many global governance approaches and studies (see the critique in Brand et al. 2000) . While power always was a central component in (neo-)realistic and (neo-)marxist approaches, it was for a long time largely neglected in the global governance discourse, rooted in liberal institutionalism. Recently the debate was opened again by Barnett/Duvall (2005) , who introduce multiple forms of power and stress that power relations influence not only the activities of the participating actors but also the effectiveness and legitimacy of the entire global governance architecture. We refer to their work and that of Bas Arts (2003) and propose to differentiate between different types of power of which actors dispose (cf. Barnett/Duvall 2005; Arts 2003 ). These types of power derive from the structures of the governance system and the function of each actor in this system. Thus we can differentiate between: discoursive power (the ability to frame and influence discourses); decision-making power (the ability to be involved in decision making and in formal norm setting); legal power (the ability to exert power based on legal structures and laws) and resource-based power (refers to the actors' disposal over material resources (e.g. money, staff) and immaterial resources (e.g. knowledge, information) and their ability to provide these resources).
These different types of power, of course, are not always equally important. This becomes clear when we look at the various spaces of interaction in global governance. We can observe that the influence of the different actors varies, depending on whether they interact with each other e.g. in a legal conflict, in an official decision-making body of an International Organization, in the implementation of a bilateral programme, or in discussions/discourses on specific issues. Referring to Norman Long's (2001) concept of social interface, which he developed for global-local interactions in development policy, we propose a concept of interfaces in global governance, which serves as a heuristic instrument to structure interactions of the different actors and to distinguish between the various channels of influence both for state and non-state actors from the South.
Long defines social interfaces 'as a critical point of interaction or linkage between different social systems, fields or levels of social order where structural discontinuities based upon differences of normative value and social interest, are most likely to be found' (Long 1989: 1-2) . Interfaces are not only two-sided forms of articulation but are more complex as they include a variety of different interests, relationships and modes of rationality. Although an interface as defined by Long can link actors with common interests, he stresses the dynamic and conflictive nature of interfaces arising from different interests, resources and power.
We modify Long's approach by concentrating less on cultural practices and sociological aspects (though not denying their importance) but focusing stronger on the political processes and dynamics in global governance, and thus adapt his definition of interfaces in the following way: 'Interfaces in global governance are socio-political spaces of recurrent interactions of collective actors in the handling of transnational and international affairs.' ). To analyse more in detail how global governance is influenced by particular actors, it is necessary to specify the types of interface. We propose to distinguish between four types of interfaces:
Discoursive interfaces, which are related to communications about a basic understanding of and strategies to deal with the issues which arise at interactions between different levels of politics and different types of actors. These might imply programmatic aspects if longer-ranging concepts of cooperation and problem-solving are developed.
Organizational interfaces appear if sporadic and unconnected activities lead to a continuity and consolidation or even the foundation of organizations, which typically comprise actors from the international and national levels of politics (partnerships, participation in organizations and/or decision making bodies, operational coopera-
tion, consolidated programmatic cooperation)
Legal interfaces occur if actors aim at influencing legislative processes and negotiations and or the implementation of law at national or international level (legal conflicts, international agreements) ).
Resource-transfer interfaces play an important role particularly in the context of development policy, but, of course, also from rich countries to multilateral organizations in various fields of social politics. Transfer of material and immaterial resources occurs between different levels of politics but also between different policy areas and types of actors.
We argue that an analysis of interactions along these different interfaces allows us to capture in detail the various channels of influence of Southern actors in global governance and thus to overcome the conventional approaches to the analysis of global governance which largely neglect regional differences in the dimensions of interests and power and often disregard the non-OECD world. 
Southern Actors in Global Health Governance
The concept of interfaces, as introduced in section 2, will be applied in the following to analyse the role of Southern actors in global health governance more systematically. It serves as heuristic instrument to structure the field of global health and to differentiate between the various channels of influence both for state and non-state actors from the South.
We will first deal with the organisational interfaces (4.1) and give an overview on Southern participation in the most relevant International Organisations in health: WHO, World Bank, UNAIDS and Global Fund. Then the role of Southern actors in the discourses on the TRIPS agreement (4.2) and the conflicts at the legal interfaces (4.3) around the access to medicines will be analysed. We argue that Southern influence at these two interface types was relatively high, while it is mixed with regard to the decision-making processes at the organisational interfaces and limited at best at the resource-transfer interfaces (4.4) that are largely dominated by the interests and strategies of bi-and multilateral donors.
Organisational Interfaces: International Organisations
The World Health Organisation (WHO) is an intergovernmental organisation which consists of governments that are members of the World Health Assembly (WHA, all member states) and the Executive Board (32 member states, appointed by the WHA). Formally, all countries the developing world (cf. Bartsch 2006 + 2007 , Radelet 2004 , Radelet/Caines 2005 , Bezanson 2005 ).
We conclude that the degree of influence of Southern actors at the organisational interfaces is closely related to the prevailing governance modes. While the GF as a hybrid form of regulation enables both state and non-state actors from the South to formally participate in the political processes and also UNAIDS shows some rudimental involvement of CSOs, the two other organisations are built on the model of state regulation which largely excludes non-state actors. Southern state actors are able to exert influence in these intergovernmental organisations to a varying degree, depending on the prevailing norms, rules and procedures. The mode of governance is thus highly relevant as it influences both the degree of inclusion/exclusion of certain actors and the power relations at the different organisational interfaces.
Discoursive Interfaces: Campaign for Access to Medicines
While the organisational interfaces in global health governance give a mixed picture in 
Legal Interfaces: Legal Disputes on Patents for Medicines
Especially two developments in the legal realm helped to reach these compromises in terms of intellectual property rights in the health sector: the unsuccessful lawsuit of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association against the South African Government in 1999 and the con- relatively weak at the resource-transfer interfaces in global health, as they depend to a large degree on international transfers. As recipients of aid they are rather objects than subjects of the respective policy-making processes, although their policy options and channels of influence vary, depending on the strategies and politics of the donor organisations.
Before the Global Fund was established in 2002, bilateral agencies and the World Bank were the most important donors in the field of global health. While it was clear from the beginning that this new institution would act independently from the World Bank, its relationship to the UN system in general was contentious. Kofi Annan and many developing countries preferred a fund inside the UN system, but the G8 countries -most decisive the US and Japan -argued for an independent institution. The official rationale for its separate structure given by the donor countries was the lack of flexibility and efficiency of the UN system.
However, it can be assumed that political interests in by-passing the UN played an important role. The idea of installing a new institution outside the UN system -and thus more directly under control of the donor countries -seemed appealing to these actors as it could operate more according to their own interests and strategies (branded drugs, prevention methods).
Thus, nation states (like in this case mainly the USA) use hybrid regulation and a network structure (the Global Fund) to circumvent international state-based organisations (WHO, UNAIDS) that are the formal and legitimised public health organisations responsible for dealing with HIV/AIDS. This means that hybrid regulation can be a result of nation state interests and not only an approach of common problem-solving in fields of high interdependence, as often assumed. We observe here a typical example of forum shifting (for the concept see: Braithwaite/Drahos 2000) 6 since the powerful actors (like in this case the USA and other G8 countries) shifted the issue of funding to that newly created hybrid organisation. PEPFAR thus can be interpreted as a reaction of the US government to developments in the Global Fund which did not converge with their original interest. While it was assumed in the beginning that the GF would mainly finance branded drugs (and thus secure markets for the large pharmaceutical companies) and that the influence of donor countries over national policies would be relatively strong, the GF under the explicit leadership of its then Executive Director Richard Feachem managed to develop its own policies, based on the principles of national ownership, partnership and performance-based funding. It leaves politically delicate questions like the use of condoms or the issue of generic drugs to the countries themselves and does not interfere much from the global level with the respective policies. The pharmaceutical industry is only represented at the Executive Board as member of the private sector delegation, but did not manage to obtain a Board seat; and also its desire to contribute to the GF via the provision of (branded) drugs was rejected various times. Furthermore, the Global Fund with its hybrid regulation and its bottom-up approach furthers participation of different types of stakeholders and thus implicates a sharing of power with other actors (among them CSOs and governments of developing countries). These developagenda in more than one organisation and (4) preventing an international organisation from acting as a forum for regulatory development in the first place.
ments made it obviously less attractive for some Northern governments to support the Global Fund and contributed to the establishment of competing initiatives like PEPFAR which follow a stronger top-down approach, which limits the influence of actors from developing countries significantly. tively independent from its donors and that it developed in a different way then originally assumed, substantial resources were channelled through PEPFAR, where the US government was able to shape processes more directly than in the GF. It is also interesting to see how the US strategies where influenced through the respective institutional setting: Whilst the US delegation to the Fund tolerates -in spite of all criticism of conservative groups and politicians in the US -the use of generics and condoms in the fight against HIV/AIDS, PEPFAR -as outlined -mainly gives money for patented drugs and propagates prevention methods like being abstinent instead of using condoms. The institutional context thus has an important effect on the behaviour and strategies of actors, as hybrid forms of regulationsuch as networks and partnerships -tend to include a stronger necessity to enter compromises and modify strategies than purely state-based forms of governance, where actors are able to act more autonomously.
Conclusion
The constellation of actors in the fight against HIV/AIDS -as in the field of global health governance in general -is very heterogeneous, with actors differing not only with regard to their character (public, non-public), their institutional structure (formalized, informal) or their level of activity (global, national, local), but also with regard to their interests, their logic of action and their power resources. By analysing the institutional structure and its implications for discourses and decision-making processes in global health governance we have shown that Southern actors (governments and CSOs) are able to influence the course of and the dominant role of governments of donor countries. This leads to a multiplicity of actors and institutional fragmentation. This structure of global health governance seems to be inconsistent and contradictory as hybrid regulation and the involvement of civil society organisations can put powerful nation states under pressure and cause them to make compromises at least in some cases and consequently can weaken them to some extent.
,Governments, however, can use networks and hybrid regulation and even CSOs as fora to achieve their goals -e.g. to weaken International Organisations like WHO or to circumvent disliked governments in the South. Thus, the strong role of Northern governments and the increasing relevance of hybrid, private and civil society regulation are intertwined.
The analysis of the field of global health has shown that the role of Southern actors in global governance processes is mixed, as politics at the interfaces are influenced both by the constellation of actors defined by their interests and power resources and by the different modes of governance involved. Our analysis thus leads us to the following conclusions:
The more the type of power an actors disposes of corresponds with the type of interface, the more influence that actor is able to exert.
The greater the heterogeneity of interests the more conflictive the political processes at the interfaces.
The mode of governance and the corresponding logic restricts the autonomy of the actors and structures the interactions at the interfaces.
Powerful actors tend to choose that mode of governance that seems to be most adequate for reaching their objectives. The current multifaceted structure of global governance provides many different opportunities for strategies of forum shifting. At the same time, these strategies have a considerable impact on this differentiation of global governance, as they further the creation of new institutions.
Especially in 'soft' policy fields actors like CSOs and governments of the South, which are normally perceived as weak, have the chance to influence strategies and policies due to their specific power resources and the institutional setting of global governance. This is especially the case when other actors basically ignore -at least for a certain time -a policy field or when interests overlap or converge to a certain degree. Forms of hybrid, private and civil society regulation offer opportunities and chances for an increased participation and weight of Southern actors. At the same time, however, they can contribute to a fragmentation of activities and an ineffectiveness of global governance, and they can also be used by powerful actors to bypass certain institutions and actors that do not function according to their interests and/or are contested in terms of conflict with other actors.
The different types of interfaces in global governance have a double function in that context.
On the one hand they serve as points of mediation between the particular interests of actors (e.g. pooling of funds and knowledge at the resource-transfer interfaces; coordinated activities through organizational interfaces), and thus allow a better integration of Southern perspectives in global processes. On the other hand they are also arenas of global conflicts (e.g.
conflicts between market-and welfare-oriented interests at the legal interfaces; conflicts on different normative worldviews at the discoursive interfaces), where different norms and interests collide. They thus not only shape specific interactions processes in global governance, but also influence the relationship between economy, state and civil society in the broader context of North-South relations.
